European Union Seminar – A Book Discussion: Europe's Crisis of Legitimacy

Hello, everyone On behalf of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, I am Vassilis Coutifaris, and we are happy to join our European Union seminar today We have our Karl Kaiser from the Kennedy School and the project on Europe and Jane Mansbridge from the Kennedy School, who have very kindly agreed to join us for the discussion on Vivien Schmidt’s book I wanted to particularly highlight that this is part of the Worldwide Week at Harvard Thank you, Vassilis Welcome to all of you, both in the United States and in Europe and possibly elsewhere I don’t know I’m delighted to welcome in particular my co-chair I am Karl Kaiser by the way, co-chair of the seminar on the European Union I’m very delighted that my co-chair, Vivien Schmidt, has joined us to present her book It deals with a subject that has been debated for many years It’s probably the most debated topic on European integration theory It’s a question of legitimacy and democracy She has finished and presented a monumental book under the title of Europe’s Crisis of Legitimacy with a very suggestive subtitle Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers, in which she focuses in particular on the eurozone question of legitimacy and democracy Vivien is Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration at Boston University She has published enormously on European affairs several books– one on democracy in Europe, another one on European capitalism and its future And we’re extremely delighted that a colleague, at the Kennedy School, Jane Mansbridge, is going to join us to discuss the book and open the discussion Jane is Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values at the Kennedy School And she herself has written enormously on democracy, on accountability, on negotiations, on feminism to name but some subjects Vivien will introduce the topic, and then Jane will take over Vivien, the floor is yours Thank you, Karl, for that lovely introduction Thank you, Jenny, for being here Thank you, audience, as well for participating, listening to me as I talk to you about my new book And one might ask, why legitimacy? And for me, this was really– using legitimacy was to be able to have a lens through which to evaluate what happened during the eurozone crisis in terms of political economy, politics, and governance And it was a way to pull them together, as well as to evaluate them Everyone talks about legitimacy But actually, very few people precisely deal with, what does it mean and how would you use it to assess governing authority and governing activities during the eurozone crisis? So that’s why legitimacy The kind of approach I use is what, in political science– this is for the political scientists in the room The approach is what I call discursive institutionalism, which essentially looks at the importance of ideas in discursive interactions in political analysis and within institutional contexts And I think it’s particularly useful here because it serves as a bridge to political theory– questions of legitimacy– at the same time that it also takes us back to how to think about traditional neoinstitutionalisms along with the role of ideas and discourse So this is about showing how interests are reconceptualized, rules reinterpreted, and cultural scripts reframed So what about, what’s the book about? My argument is this is a crisis not just about economics or politics It’s also about legitimacy In 2010, as the eurozone crisis exploded, eurozone EU actors decided to govern by rules and rule by numbers But in so doing, legitimacy was at risk as a result of increasingly deteriorating economics and more and more toxic politics So what you saw is it’s not just–

it’s not that things remained fixed There was a response By 2012, 2013, there’s a recognition this wasn’t working And you saw all EU actors begin to reinterpret the rules and recalculate the numbers But the problem is they still have problems of legitimacy because they did this by stealth They wouldn’t admit what they knew what was going on And the result was you did have incremental improvement, but you still had the suboptimal rules and you have perceptions of illegitimacy The Northern Europeans felt deceived The Southern Europeans felt oppressed, even when accommodated By 2015 on, there’s a recognition that this kind of reinterpretation of the rules by stealth wasn’t working, and you got an admission by all actors that they were indeed reinterpreting the rules to ensure greater legitimacy But the damage had already been done So that’s the main thesis So how do we define legitimacy? Two ways– one is legitimacy as a governing authority, and that’s the way we ordinarily think about it in terms of its basis in public consent and trust This is a Weberian approach But there’s also legitimacy as governing activity, and that’s what I focus on in the book That’s about policy effectiveness, political responsiveness, and the procedural quality of governance So in this context, we might first want to, before we look more closely into the crisis itself, we might ask a more general question, is the EU democratically legitimate? As a governing authority, I would say, yes You can see large levels of– high levels of public trust in the EU And in any case, the legitimacy of the EU as a governing authority was built up in policy area after policy area over time But then is– what about is the EU a democracy, which is the next question? No, but its member states are And the EU is its member states So even here, you could argue that in traditional ways of defining legitimacy and Democratic legitimacy involving governing authority, yes The EU’s legitimate But what about governing activity? In many areas, yes It’s equally legitimate But problems came in with the eurozone crisis Before I go into the eurozone crisis then, we need to ask what, are these– how do you legitimate in terms of governing activities? And there are three ways to think of these governing activities– legitimacy as political, as performance, and as procedural So this is all takes us back to EU systems theory So apologies for the jargon But in EU studies, people talk about output legitimacy This is a performance criterion It’s about policy effectiveness and good performance Input legitimacy is a political criterion It’s about citizen representation, participation, and responsiveness And when we take these two kinds of criteria, two legitimizing mechanisms, often people think that there’s– or scholars think– that there’s a trade-off It may be a bad policy It doesn’t work, but the people voted for it On the other hand, it may be a good policy And therefore, it’s legitimate even if people didn’t know about it, didn’t vote for it, or may have been initially unclear about it More of one makes up for less of the other So what about this third criteria, third legitimizing mechanism, throughput legitimacy? It’s a procedural criterion, and it looks at the quality of the processes And here, a whole range of words that we use but we don’t pull together– which I’ve tried to do with the with the term “throughput”– is efficacy, accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, openness And these are the words that constantly are used when we talk about procedural legitimacy And I think the key here is to recognize that whereas input and output may have trade-offs, throughput doesn’t If it’s good, if your procedures are good, of high quality, then it’s almost invisible Input moves through throughput to output But if it’s not good because the procedures and the actors are incompetent, corrupt, biased, or oppressive, then it can taint the performance and skew the politics So I think this is important in particular in the eurozone crisis because there is an assumption by EU actors that all you have to do is follow the rules– reinforce the rules, even– and you’ll have good performance output

And it doesn’t matter if the people didn’t vote for it, political input And of course, that was a major flaw which EU actors began to recognize after a certain period of time So how does legitimacy work, though, in the EU? Well, here, I see a split-level legitimacy At the EU level, we can talk about performance and procedures– output and throughput– and at the national level, political input for the most part People vote at the national level, but then decisions are taken at the EU level and we can then decide whether– see if they work or not And this, as I wrote way back in my 2006 book, can make for policy without politics at the EU level and politics without policy at the national level And what I’ve done is revise this thesis to say that with the eurozone crisis, this policy without politics at the national level can even now become politics against policy So what we see is increasing politicization of eurozone governments at the bottom, growing euroskepticism From bottom up, we’ve gone from a permissive consensus– citizens don’t care– to a constraining dissensus, as member state leaders follow their citizens’ cues and become less and less able to achieve positive outcomes, positive decisions But importantly, at the top, it’s not just the Council that’s politicized from the bottom up but at the top, we see a new politicized dynamics of interaction amongst all EU actors as member state leaders in the Council may complain about the Commission or the ECB as being too politicized or doing too much or too little, as the Commission then claims it’s a political Commission that starts in 2015, and as the ECB, supposed to be credible and not dealing with political actors, engages in a charm offensive with member state leaders to ensure that its policies are accepted That’s politicization at the top So the question becomes, is politicization a good thing or a bad thing? Well, given that there’s a lot of contestation and people are accusing one another of this or that, the content can be pretty bad– a bad thing, in a way, for politicization But you could argue You could actually look at the processes, the fact that EU actors are talking to one another more and more, that they’re communicating to the general public about how they see these various acts, you could say that in terms of Democratic processes, this is actually a good thing This looks more and more like democracy at the national level and in its own way can be seen as legitimizing I see ultimately this is a positive thing, and you see this increasingly over time So now I want to look more deeply and very quickly into these different EU actors, in particular in terms of procedural legitimacy or throughput And what I do here– because initially, I wanted to say, these ones are bad Those are wrong Those are right But I thought, no, no, no We’re actually thinking about legitimacy We have to present all sides and ask, how do you develop a sense of what is legitimate? So I take a Janus-faced view And I’m going to give you two different views of each of the important EU actors So we start with the Council And the question here is, was it a dictator in the eurozone crisis or a deliberative body? As a dictator, we can say it was led by Germany and a Northern European coalition This was one-size-fits-one, the one being Germany This was not a representative, a politically representative, form, even though Sarkozy and Merkel at one point– 2011, ’12– said yes, this is great We really represent– this is– it’s not a representative form And Germany, in this context, could not be called a benevolent hegemon either We can talk about Germany’s econom– and its coalition partners, mind you– as its economic interests being served Germany was fine– no mutualization of debt, no transfer union In terms of political interests, Merkel actually didn’t do so well in the various elections But there was a concern there, the German Constitutional Court, the only one in the EU, that basically kept saying, no, we don’t want this We don’t want that And of course, in Merkozy– Merkel with Sarkozy was Merkel leading So that’s the most negative you can have with Germany’s role as “dictator.” On the other hand, wait a minute Wasn’t this possibly a mutually accountable deliberative body? There was a lot of deliberation going on

Everyone agreed on the rules Even if we say that deliberation was in the shadow of Germany, they were deliberating And in fact, if you look over time, Germany gave in a lot This was no dictator When you look at it, the discourse goes from stability– yes, in 2010– to growth in 2012, to flexibility in 2014, into investment in 2015 So what you could say is, actually, this could– for normal countries and activities, this could be seen as, really, a mutually accountable deliberative body I think the only place where you could say, wait a minute is Programme countries Here, I think the only alternatives– and they’re not nice, either one– is either harsh dictatorship, if we think about the third Greek bailout in 2015, or deliberative authoritarianism for Ireland and Portugal, where the leaders of these countries accepted what were essentially authoritary They deliberated about it, but they accepted what could be seen as an authoritarian imposition That’s the troika and the Eurogroup in particular OK, that’s the Council What about the European Central Bank? Here are Janus-faced approaches It’s either hero or ogre As a hero in terms of monetary policy, you can see the move from one-size-fits-none– this is eurozone policy that doesn’t work for anyone– to whatever it takes, in the famous words of Draghi in 2012 And what you see is that the ECB actually legitimates what it is doing all the time, kind of hiding its reinterpretation in plain view as it goes from a focus on credibility and a very narrow interpretation of its mandate to an increasingly expansive one All the way from no, we’re not a lender of last resort to quantitative easing in 2015– really important So what we see, I think, for the ECB as hero is procedural, or throughput, accountability, doing this via expert networks and the European Parliament So it’s both a sort of policy coordination but also political communication So that’s on the good side On the ogre side, however, it pushed austerity and structural reform on a regular basis There was a lack of accountability in its quid pro quo on fiscal consolidation OK, we do this But then, everyone tightens their belts Everyone does austerity and Programme countries even worse There was a lack of transparency If we go back to [INAUDIBLE] secret letters to the leaders of Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, where it basically said, unless you do what we tell you, we’re pulling the plug and your banking system and everything else will blow up And there’s a lack of efficacy The ECB waited way too long on becoming a lender of last resort and quantitative easing The Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of England, were already doing this in 2008 and continued to doing this The ECB came late to it So again, hero or ogre? For the Commission, the question is, were they ayatollahs of austerity as enforcers in the semester’s one-size-fits-all rules or were they ministers of moderation from 2013 on? And if you think about the Commission, it was really between a rock– Northern Europe– and a hard place, Southern Europe And what we see here as well is that as performance fails, the Commission says, this isn’t working And they become increasingly flexible– more and more administrative discretion, derogations of the rules to France and Italy twice, to Spain Well, we’ll allow you to recalculate the numbers And what you see is they begin slowing deficit reduction, and they change the definitions of structural reform in their annual growth survey But in these first years from 2012ish, 2013, to 2015, all the Commissioner’s discourse is still ayatollah-like because he’s trying to hide the Commission’s reinterpretation of the rules for obvious reasons because he’d be in trouble with Northern Europe He really believed in the rules, but he also believed that you needed to do something about this So again, for the Commission– oh, I guess for Juncker, 2015, they basically say, OK, now we’re going to tell the truth about our flexibility But we’re going to provide rules for flexibility So we’re not getting out of the rules-based rules in numbers, but it’s increasingly flexible

And what you could say is for the Commission, they move from ayatollahs of austerity to increasingly ministers of moderation Finally, for the Parliament, the big question here is, is it a talking shop with no sides at all, in particular in the eurozone crisis when it was sidelined? Or has it become an increasingly equal partner? And here, you say it gets more and more– it has more and more legislative input via codecision process it becomes increasingly the go-to body for input or political legitimacy as the ECB has its regular meetings with it and uses it as a legitimacy form And the Commission goes to it as well, plus it gets more power via the spitzenkandidat procedure And it increasingly exercises critical voice in its reports, in its hearings, et cetera So I mean, what we can say is over time, it seems to me that all EU actors gain increasing throughput legitimacy But what about output and input legitimacy, or sort of performance and politics? And here, I’ll go much more quickly I have chapters, long chapters, in the book on this But this, many people have written about in terms of the political economists on the performance side and very critically and comparative politics and political people on the political legitimacy So here are two questions for performance legitimacy Effectiveness of the policy ideas? No There were failures in framing, saying it was a public debt crisis rather than private debt crisis, failures in the diagnosis, saying it was behavioral People weren’t following the rules, or it was really about the structure of the euro And as a result, you got a bad choice of remedies, doubling down on the rules, and a lack of solutions– no real fiscal solidarity, or not sufficient, no eurobonds, European monetary funds Banking union does come, but it still doesn’t have sufficient backstops, et cetera And what happens with these policy ideas you get in terms of policy performance and outcomes? You get increasing macroeconomic divergence, even though the whole idea was there should be convergence, major differences between so-called surplus countries and deficit countries, little or uneven growth And this you can contrast with the US and its response And then, of course, austerity and structural reform, in particular for Southern European countries, was very problematic And we saw across the board rising unemployment and poverty And then what about input legitimacy, or political legitimacy? Rising euroskepticism, declining trust, and we can see the sources of discontent And of course, there are many different sources that have a long history that don’t just deal with the eurozone But this just added to them– the socioeconomics of people feeling left behind, the sociocultural loss of status, and the politics of take back control, Brexit being the best example And we see massive political polarization, the decline of mainstream parties and the rise of populist eurosceptic extremes So what to do about this? Well, I have a long conclusion about how to reform the eurozone– more fiscal solidarity, better processes, and more avenues for political input I won’t go into these I’m happy to do that in the discussion But importantly, what’s really important here is the COVID-19 crisis has actually changed everything because the sorts of things that weren’t done in the eurozone crisis have now started being done So in addition, sort of an extra bonus that’s not in the book because as the book went to press, [AUDIO OUT] the COVID-19 crisis had just hit And I managed to change the first line of the book, which said, in the past decade, the eurozone crisis was arguably the worst crisis the EU has ever experienced So I managed to add, prior to COVID-19 pandemic, the eurozone crisis was the worst crisis But that’s all I could do So here’s a little bonus, which is that in terms of the COVID-19 crisis initially, but in a very brief period, it looked like the eurozone crisis déja vu all over again Council looked unaccountable, failed to act as the member states pursued their own policies The ECB claimed, it’s not my mandate to deal with spreads between German and Italian bonds European Parliament had no role, and the Commission was nowhere Plus it looked like the migration crisis

yet again, as national borders were closed But things changed incredibly quickly for better procedural legitimacy, or throughput, and better performance legitimacy The member states, what did they do? They end austerity They end budget with massive infusions of money to national capital to sustain unemployment, to keep jobs, to keep businesses open And in the Council, the Franco-German duo was back again as a truly newly accountable deliberative body without any of the dictator-like qualities that we could have seen previously The ECB was the hero now, without the ogre like austerity and structural reform And it’s massively buying bonds, even more than before The Commission were truly ministers of moderation as they suspend budgetary criteria, suspend straight aid They recommend a massive European recovery fund, sustain employment, et cetera And the European Parliament has less of a role, but it will have a major role in the budgetary fight to reinstate money for the health agency, to try to push for rule of law, et cetera So to conclude, what next? There’s still some way to go The populist revolt is not over Governing by rules and ruling by numbers in the eurozone have only been suspended, not officially revoked The eurozone still lacks the necessary instruments to ensure optimal performance, complete banking union, and a whole range of other things But the response to to the COVID crisis reverses some of the worst legitimacy lapses of the eurozone So I see this at least as a very good start Thank you Thank you very much, Vivien, for your talk and, in particular, the turn at the end to which we will come back also in the end of discussion Jenny, you have the floor You have to unmute I’m muting– unmute myself, OK Here we go And I’m also going to try to share a screen with you The problem is that it’s very hard OK, good I think this will work This book brings together a line of research that Vivien Schmidt has been pursuing since I first came across it with great excitement in her 2002 book, Futures of European Capitalism, and I’ve been following since through her work on discursive institutionalism More than– far more than most political scientists, empirical political scientists, Schmidt cares about the realm of discourse, the realm that my colleague, Archon Fung, at the Kennedy School and a recent Kennedy School video on power called the fourth level of power, a critically important but often neglected level of power I have little in the way of criticism But I will try to show you how– points of the book that excited me particularly and that I might go on with The frame that I use has three prongs– a strong stress on legitimacy, a system-wide approach that makes administration central, and a stress on discourse Now, legitimacy– in my work over the last 10 years, I’ve emphasized that as we human beings become more interdependent, we will need more free-use goods Those are– free-use goods are goods that once you produce them, anyone can use them They’re free to use without paying to produce them So if you can use it without paying to produce it, you don’t bother paying to produce it and it doesn’t get produced That’s the free-rider problem everyone recognizes as the collective action problem And the issue here is that these free-use goods, like toll-free roads or city-supplied internet, facilitate interdependence As we get more and more interdependent, we have greater and greater need for free-use goods That means we have more and more free-rider problems And although we can use lots of mechanisms to create the solidarity and duty that will give people– let people voluntarily contribute to producing these goods, in communities of strangers where you can’t use tit-for-tat and reputation, you’re going to need state coercion

So that means that as we get more interdependent, we have more free-use goods We create more free-rider problems Then we’re going to need more and more state coercion Nobody likes state coercion So that means we’re going to have to worry more and more about the legitimacy of that coercion And actually, as our needs for legitimate coercion have gone up, the legitimacy that we can back the coercion with has gone down So that’s the problem that we face Now, another wonderful thing that Schmidt does in this book is to focus on the larger system and in particular on the administration So much of work on legitimacy focuses only on the elected representatives And yet when it comes to the people, the citizens being affected by the loss, the policy that administrations make is tremendously important and the street-level application of those policies is very important And it simply won’t do to say, well, we shouldn’t give administration too much power You have to give administrations lots more power as we become more interdependent and we need more free-use goods So the focus here on administration is something that not enough political scientists do In fact, it administration has a kind of low– is relatively low on the totem pole in political science Power is sexy Administration is very unsexy And so this is incredibly important I hope everyone listening will start paying more attention to administration and the legitimacy in administration And the third prong of the focus is discourse We need discursive legitimacy, discursive what Schmidt calls mutual accountability, discursive institutionalism Now, the EU is an absolutely perfect case to look at all three of these There’s been obvious increasing state coercion, necessary increases in state coercion leading to obvious legitimacy problems When you look at the– and the EU is actually almost all administration Therefore, although output legitimacy is certainly important, input legitimacy, as Vivien just said, is filtered through elections on the national level but doesn’t– it’s sort of borrowed at the EU-level So throughput legitimacy– when you’re looking at procedure, throughput legitimacy is very important And it’s important because when output fails– and output is going to fail, as with the business cycle going up and down As output fails, you have to look to procedural legitimacy If you can’t look to input legitimacy through elections, where do you look? You look at the throughput You look at whether the administration is legitimate And discourse– of course, as you heard, the EU relies tremendously on mutual accountability and discursive institutionalism, to use two phrases that will come up over and over in Schmidt’s work So now, the crisis of legitimacy– one of the great things about this book is that it combines the normative and the empirical It looks directly at systems It notes that decision-making has moved upwards to international bodies, downwards to regional government and NGOs, sideways to regulatory agencies You’ve got to look at legitimacy in the system as a whole And throughput is what is going to characterize this Throughput plays a special role, Schmidt writes, in EU conceptions of legitimacy And she’s absolutely right Now, this throughput is discursive And it’s more legitimate the more it involves, quote from the book, “mutually accountable processes of deliberation in which the ideational power of persuasion is more in play than the coercive power of simple diktats.” We so often look at power As I say, power is sexy We need to look far more at persuasion, and that’s what this book does As you’ve just heard, the EU actors reinterpreted these rules by stealth without admitting to citizens– or even to themselves, sometimes– what they were doing and not even consulting citizens Now, what I’d like everyone listening to this webinar to think of, including Vivien and Karl as well– how can we consult with citizens? That’s not an easy thing to do There are a large number of citizens You can’t just send out administrators to consult with all of them So that’s going to be the question for the next part of the 21st century The way Vivien describes it is not just government of the people, by the people, and for the people, but with the people That’s the key issue She writes, “reason-giving in public forums is essential for throughput legitimacy.” And that’s right The administrators have to give reasons

But I think my own word that I want us to focus on is recursive communication It’s not just administrators giving reasons, but administrators giving some reasons and then listening to what citizens say, citizens giving reasons, and then listening to what the administrators say that in a recursive, over a back and forth process That’s what’s going to get us someplace, not only legitimacy but better decisions Now, Vivien notes the common opposition between interest-based bargaining and consensus-seeking deliberation That’s the dichotomy that the early Habermas brought up She advocates both Now, there’s new work on deliberative democracy– my own, I will have to say– that argues not just for both, but for the combination And the word we use is deliberative negotiation It includes integrative negotiation, which is finding ways of meeting other parties’ needs at less cost to yourself And that requires active listening because you have to find out, what are their needs? And they actually might not know their needs themselves, so you have to actively question, as well as listening We need to ask, what institutions facilitate this kind of recursive negotiation? Now, the EU has discursive institutions Vivien shows us We should recognize them, celebrate them, and improve them She points out the epistemic communities of experts– very important, more likely to innovate, she says, in slow-burning crises than in fast ones But of course, the problem with those epistemic communities is they listen to the– they’re relatively closed You’ve got the unions in there, but there’s an awful lot of listening to banking and finance Another problem is accountability There are no– there are very few appropriate forums in which they can– the member states can deliberate on their loan and be accountable to one another or to the public And I’ve run out of my 10 minutes, but I’ll point out one little point People often criticize EU institutions, discursive institutions, for not being transparent enough That’s all– some of that is all right, but it goes way too far in my view Because negotiations, which are the key in integrative negotiations or the key to getting good decisions, require secrecy They require people being able to talk without thinking three times because they’re in public So we need to balance the needs of negotiation for private spaces with the needs of transparency And so she– just one more point because this was so delicious when I read it She actually says, well, how can we tell that the Council is using deliberative persuasion? Well, let’s see if we can find them not just listening but accommodating the other side Let’s see if we can find them accepting a failure to persuade These are two criteria which an empirical political scientist can see whether there has been genuine deliberative persuasion going on or not I’ve not seen anyone do it quite so nicely, and there’s evidence that both occurred So I have a couple of suggestions myself for increasing legitimacy One is you could have– now, this is legitimacy much more on the street-level You could have citizens signing petitions that would force administrators to come to public hearings to talk about and explain and listen about regulations You get 100 signatures, you get a very low-level administrator, 1,000 signatures, a little higher, 100,000 signatures, a little higher, a million signatures, the highest person of all to come and speak You could have these randomized citizens’ assemblies sweeping Europe and that I’m very fond of I study randomized citizen lottery You could have the citizens grapple with some of these questions You could have the ombudsman take group petitions You could have various things on the street-level You could have elected politicians being able to get online with their constituents for an hour and talk about these questions And very importantly, all of the EU, or many of the EU institutions, consult stakeholders They consult, consult, consult That’s one of the things that the EU does best That’s why it’s so important that Vivien’s stressing discourse But those stakeholders, those organizations, the unions, the NGOs, they then don’t recursively– usually– consult with their constituents The citizens don’t get involved So we need more stress on civil society recursivity Gone over my time, but I can’t tell you how excited I am about this book It’s great Thank you Thank you very much, Jenny, that was wonderful

And let me, perhaps, connect your question to what Vivien said How can one increase the consultation of citizens? Vivien, you at the end, you said that the COVID measures that were taken indicate an enormous change in the policy of the European Union and change many of the points that you rightly criticize But they are outputs, right? They are not inputs So on the output side, the EU in the COVID crisis– apart from the beginning, which you indicated– the EU has been quite successful So how do you– how should be the next state to what Jenny just said, to relate the successful output now in the new situation to a more successful input? Yeah, no And thank you, Jenny, for wonderful comments And also, fascinated to see how you link it to your own work, which I admire greatly So yeah, this continues to be the problem for the EU How does the EU talk directly to the citizens when citizens also have national leaders who are also member state leaders, but they generally talk in their own capacity as national leaders when they deal with citizens? So there have to be many different ways in which one starts to engage the citizens And of course, the COVID crisis was much more about output performance but also procedural There was a lot more deliberative deliberation, deliberate mutual accountability, among leaders But national parliaments were cut out, for the most part They voted national leaders decree power, emergency powers of decree, and then went into recess What you can say is that in terms of what happened, I’ve been looking at this Trust went up immensely, jumped, as a kind of governing authority in– you see it at the national level and also in the EU And then, it went down in those countries where the leaders did not perform well I guess the best example is the UK Boris Johnson gets a 20 point boost initially, but then he gets a 40% slide in trust as a result of problems of performance, which suggests that throughput procedures, he didn’t do a good job It was not efficient, and it wasn’t effective, and people– OK But that’s only governing authority On the governing activities, there have to be ways in which– and Jenny raised those, I think There has to be ways in which there are more avenues for input, citizen input participation, not just in the COVID crisis, but more generally And so one way to do that at the EU-level is to end the unanimity rule Make it more about supermajorities with opt-outs In that way, Poland and Hungary can’t veto any rule of law proposals that get them to quit doing what they’re doing in terms of limiting the independence of the judiciary, limiting freedom of the press, et cetera But more eurozone rules, but other rules as well, should become more ordinary legislation so they can be debated in the parliaments There need to be more linkages between the EU level and the national in terms of parliaments The EU Parliament and the National Parliament But none of this actually still at addresses Jenny’s point about more civil society The EU has had some initiatives over this– on this over the years There is a citizen petition There is an ombudsman But it’s early days in terms of citizens recognizing that they can actually do something There is also what we can talk about, kind of the pluralist processes that we know about– well, in the US– that you don’t see sufficiently in terms of civil society groups Or put another way, there’s a kind of disconnect between civil society groups– i.e public interest groups– making their views known at the EU level And they’re often international groups, in particular in the environment there, and then the national groups, which don’t go to Brussels nearly enough, which often tend to lobby their national capitals that

then represent them So in a way– and I thought about this in the past In a way, the EU has to understand what Americans came to understand in the ’70s, ’60s, ’70s, when all of a sudden you realized, hmm We need marches on Washington We need to organize ourselves to present our views in Washington That was the US in the ’70s and continued It still needs a lot of work But the EU has barely started It still doesn’t answer the COVID questions So I think, here, it’s got to be multi-level It’s that you need representation You need civil society You need– I love this recursive deliberation and engagement That’s really important And you need it at all different levels and more and more of it That’s the only way I see anything succeeding Thank you, Vivien Questions can be asked You know the procedure You can ask the question in the question and answers And I have one by Maxim Soshinsky Is there a method to quantify legitimacy? How would you approach to such an issue? Well, Vivien I leave that to people who do quantitative work, to quantify legitimacy But what I can say is I use these criteria We can see these as normative criteria, but they can be empirically dealt with so that one can– in terms of quantitative analysis, I use surveys You can see that in terms of how much trust One can use experiments There’s a whole– these political scientists have a massive toolkit to use One can do, for the discursive institutionalism, you can do qualitative studies But you can also do quantitative ones in terms of content analysis, machine learning to see to what extent you see a change And Jenny mentioned something that I think is tremendously important, a look at how– what actors say before going into negotiations and what they’re saying after That already gives you a sense of the extent to which you may have had discursive persuasion going on in the meetings All of that, I think, is– and you can do that quantitatively through content analysis as much as qualitatively Yes I’ll just add a little bit to that on the survey side A couple of questions are obvious One is the trust in government question, and the other is, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country? Denmark gets very high marks on this, partly because of its municipalization reforms– Quinton Mayne makes the argument– partly for other reasons, including the way they do the administration They go out there with questionnaires asking the citizens what they want and whether the trains are running a route properly, and so forth, and so on So that’s recursive Denmark’s very good at that And so you can measure that, that they get the highest scores not only in the eurobarometer, but pretty much in the world So you can measure it through surveys And then on the normative front, that’s perceived legitimacy On the normative front, you come up with criteria of what you think is a legitimate way of doing things If you’re trying to measure, for example, discourse, Jurg Steiner and André Bachtiger and a very good group of other people have worked on something called the Discourse Quality Index, by which they measured For example, the British Parliament comes out very low, obviously on– not the House of Lords, but the Commons comes out very low on discourse quality This group of people are from Switzerland It’s not surprising that Switzerland comes out relatively high But most importantly, the private chambers come out much higher When they meet in private, they come out much higher on discourse quality because they’re really trying to engage with one another, rather than just make speeches to the public So that these things can be measured Question to you, Vivien– how do you see the origins of the rather fundamental change that have occurred with the COVID crisis? What pressures do you think were the most important, including the ones from outside, the realization that the European Union is in– not only faces pressures from below, but faces pressures

from outside, the international system, the American government under President Trump? How do you see it? It’s a rather extraordinary story that, for example, the Northerners, including Germany, accept the idea of a transfer union that they resisted for so long? Yeah, thanks That’s– yeah Thank you That’s a really important question, and there are a range of ways we can analyze it One thing is true, that the pressures are enormous But you know, the pressures have been there for a long time from the outside The US since 2016, things have not been going very well between the US and the EU And Russia is a problem, the Middle East, issues of the migration crisis, the lack of growth, the increasing divergence between North and South All of those are there So it is really a big question, why now? And there are many ways in which one can answer that One is you could say, well, it’s about the crisis itself It’s a symmetrical crisis Before it was asymmetrical Or at least, it was perceived as asymmetrical And Northern Europeans could say, Oh, no, it’s about debt This is also about culture Debt in German is “schuld,” shame, sin We don’t trust those Southern Europeans They’ve been overspending their money Punish them They need to pay So you can talk about an asymmetrical crisis versus a symmetrical one now, where everyone is hit by the crisis, although Southern Europe more But there is a sense that we need to all hang together This is about, as Jenny said, about interdependence But how do we explain– I mean, this is interesting in view of the discussion of Germany as whether dictator or part of a mutually accountable deliberative body And the big question is, how do we explain the massive change of heart? And I think part of it may have to do with it being a symmetrical crisis But part of it also may be with the kind of crisis it is This is a humanitarian crisis And if we look at Angela Merkel’s response to the migration crisis, it was also this a humanitarian event We need to do something with a very different reaction from the other But it’s not just about Germany It’s also France I think there’s also a lot of what political scientists would call learning going on I think that in people’s heart of hearts, they knew that they’d blown it in terms of the eurozone crisis But path dependent historical institutions, you’ve got these rules How do you go out? Yes, you can reinterpret the rules by stealth and you can then admit to your reinterpreting it But you still have the rules And all of a sudden, everyone says, no, these rules don’t work Everything has changed, and those changes it’s in– and Jenny referred to this In a fast-burning crisis, political agents look around for answers And if there are no answers, they look to the technical actors But if it’s an unprecedented crisis, technical actors don’t know what to do And you’ve got the Commission saying, let’s double down on the rules for the eurozone crisis and the EU leaders saying, yeah, let’s do that And it became one thing piling on another But when you go from a fast-burning crisis to the slow-burning crisis, technical actors start working on alternative solutions And we saw in particular since 2015, although even before, the Commission, especially the Commission, looking for ways to solve these problems They were providing– they were working on their own They were also suggesting new ways to deal with Nothing happened And then all of a sudden, this new crisis hits And one that you might say is better because it’s clear that it’s about interdependence It’s clear that everyone is suffering and that everyone needs to pull together because the virus knows no borders And it’s at that point the Commission says, we have some really good solutions At the national level, basically no one hesitated We have to spend money to get out of this Neoliberalism out the window extraordinarily, given how it was resilient over and over and over again prior to this, as debt keeps coming back Remember, the Neo-Keynesian push for nine months And then, by 2010, it was gone But now, maybe it will last

I think there may be a complete change of heart with new instruments that already take the EU so much farther– as you said, Karl– breaking the taboo of EU-level debt, even if it’s a temporary fund, even if the frugal four said, no, we don’t want this But note what happened in the mutually accountable deliberations on this It was recursive, very much There was bargaining, but there was also arguing There was deliberation, persuasive deliberation, where the frugal forum managed to water things down a bit But the essence, it really went forward This is a major leap forward, and I don’t see any going back And I see new– let’s call it path dependence now– in ideas, but also in rules That may very well suggest that the EU has turned the corner We’ve got to see The rules are still in place three years hence Someone will probably come back up and say, oh, no, debt is the problem And it is a problem But growth is the way out of debt, not necessarily tightening one’s belt Unfortunately, our time is up So Vivien and I are going to say that the next book will not have the crisis in its title Things are changing in the European Union There’s no doubt about that, and the scholarly community will have to look at this In any case, Vivien Schmidt has written a monumental seminal book I hope you can all read it I can only read it in its electronic version I hope it will soon be available in the market And it is It is It is on the market, yes It’s just still arriving It is now available physically OK, very good So thank you all, Vivien and Jenny, very much for– and all of you who participated And that ends the section Bye bye